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OPINION 
____________ 
 
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge. 
 These two appeals arise from the failure of a Turkish 
arms manufacturer to pay a thirty-year-old judgment. The 
first appeal (No. 12-4500) requires us to review the District 
Court’s order granting counsel’s motion to withdraw. 
Perceiving no abuse of discretion, we will affirm that order. 
The second appeal (No. 12-4065) challenges the District 
Court’s conclusion that certain post-judgment discovery 
requests impose an “undue burden.” Because the District 
Court erred when it relied upon the uncertainty surrounding 
the judgment creditor’s ability to attach the targeted property, 
we will vacate that order and remand. 
I 
 The historical facts underlying this dispute are 
incidental to the issues now before us, so we recount them 
only briefly. In 1975, a pistol manufactured by the judgment 
debtor malfunctioned, firing a bullet through Robert 
Ohntrup’s hand while he loaded the gun. Robert and his wife 
Beverly filed a products liability action in the District Court 
against the seller of the pistol, Firearms Center, Inc., and its 
owners. Defendants then impleaded the manufacturer of the 
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pistol, Makina ve Kimya Endustrisi Kurumu (MKEK), which 
is wholly owned by the Republic of Turkey. After a bench 
trial, the District Court entered a final judgment holding 
Firearms Center and MKEK jointly liable for $847,173.97 
and obliging MKEK to indemnify Firearms Center. MKEK 
appealed and we affirmed. See Appeal of Makina ve Kimya 
Endustrisi Kurumu (Ohntrup I), 760 F.2d 259 (3d Cir. 1985). 
The law firm of Morgan Lewis & Bockius (the Firm or 
Morgan Lewis) represented MKEK throughout the products 
liability litigation. MKEK terminated the Firm after learning 
that we dismissed its appeal in March 1985, and the Firm 
filed a motion to withdraw. Under the local rules of the 
United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania, an attorney must receive permission from that 
court to withdraw unless his client appoints replacement 
counsel. See E.D. Pa. Local R. 5.1(c). It permitted the 
individual Morgan Lewis lawyers to withdraw but required 
the Firm to remain as counsel of record until MKEK hired 
substitute counsel. 
The Firm appealed the partial denial of its motion to 
withdraw, but we affirmed. Ohntrup v. Firearms Ctr., Inc. 
(Ohntrup II), 802 F.2d 676 (3d Cir. 1986). In doing so, we 
noted that the Firm filed its motion only a few months after 
the Ohntrups initiated collection efforts, when it remained to 
be seen whether MKEK would ultimately comply with the 
District Court’s discovery orders. At that time, we viewed the 
Firm as an important conduit for communication between the 
Ohntrups and MKEK, which had already earned its reputation 
as an “intract[a]ble litigant.” Id. at 679. Without the Firm, we 
noted that the substantial communication gap between the 
Ohntrups and MKEK would hamper post-judgment 
proceedings. Id. 
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The Ohntrups tried in vain to collect their judgment, as 
MKEK disregarded the Ohntrups’ discovery requests. The 
Ohntrups sought assistance from the United States 
Department of State and they pursued MKEK in the Turkish 
courts, both to no avail. They also tried to add the Republic of 
Turkey as a defendant under an alter ego theory, but Turkey 
and MKEK ignored the District Court’s discovery orders in 
that regard. 
In 2007, eight years after Robert died of cancer, 
Beverly, in her personal capacity and as administrator of 
Robert’s estate (collectively, Ohntrup), obtained a $16 million 
civil contempt judgment against MKEK that grows by 
$10,000 annually until MKEK complies with discovery. 
Meanwhile, the original judgment continues to increase by 
ten percent each year to account for delay damages. 
Ohntrup’s judgments against MKEK are now worth about 
$25 million. 
Over twenty-five years have passed, and MKEK has 
yet to respond to a discovery request or participate in any way 
in post-judgment proceedings. Despite having been thwarted 
at seemingly every turn, Ohntrup’s lawyers continue their 
dogged pursuit of MKEK. In 2011, they learned of a $16.2 
million transaction in which a Minneapolis-based company 
called Alliant Techsystems, Inc. (Alliant), agreed to sell 
munitions manufacturing components to MKEK. Ohntrup 
obtained some initial discovery from Alliant, but the District 
Court entered an order denying Ohntrup’s subsequent 
discovery requests. When Ohntrup recently renewed her post-
judgment discovery efforts, Morgan Lewis again sought leave 
to withdraw as counsel for MKEK. This time, the District 
Court granted the motion to withdraw. Ohntrup appeals both 
orders. 
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II 
The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1332. We have jurisdiction over both appeals 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. In Morgan Lewis’s previous 
appeal of this dispute, we applied the doctrine of “practical 
finality” to exercise jurisdiction over its appeal of the District 
Court’s order denying its motion to withdraw from 
representing MKEK. Ohntrup II, 802 F.2d at 678. For the 
reasons stated in that opinion, we have jurisdiction over 
Ohntrup’s present appeal of the District Court’s order 
granting the Firm’s withdrawal from representing MKEK 
(No. 12-4500). 
As for Ohntrup’s appeal of the District Court’s order 
denying post-judgment discovery in aid of execution (No. 12-
4065), the same rationale again leads us to conclude that we 
have jurisdiction. The District Court’s order in that appeal 
prevents Ohntrup from learning more about the munitions 
manufacturing components she claims belong to MKEK. 
Without that information, Ohntrup is unable to attach the 
property. The District Court’s order ends Ohntrup’s pursuit of 
that property, and to deny jurisdiction would render the 
District Court’s order effectively unreviewable. This would 
be inappropriate for the same reasons found by some of our 
sister courts, which have applied the doctrine of practical 
finality to exercise jurisdiction over orders denying post-
judgment discovery. See Wilkinson v. F.B.I., 922 F.2d 555, 
558 (9th Cir. 1991), overruled on other grounds by Kokkonen 
v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375 (1994); United 
States v. McWhirter, 376 F.2d 102, 104–06 (5th Cir. 1967); 
see also Saldana-Sanchez v. Lopez-Gerena, 256 F.3d 1, 7 
n.12 (1st Cir. 2001) (endorsing this proposition). We join 
those courts in holding that a judgment creditor may appeal 
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from the denial of discovery in aid of execution. Accordingly, 
we have jurisdiction to hear both appeals. 
III 
Having established our jurisdiction, we turn to 
Ohntrup’s appeal of the District Court’s order granting 
Morgan Lewis’s motion to withdraw. After Ohntrup recently 
restarted efforts to collect on the judgment, the Firm renewed 
the request the District Court denied over twenty-five years 
ago and asked for permission to withdraw as counsel for 
MKEK. Finding that continued representation would serve no 
meaningful purpose, the District Court entered an order 
granting the motion. We review that decision for abuse of 
discretion. Ohntrup II, 802 F.2d at 679. 
Our decision in Ohntrup II and this appeal both 
implicate the relevant local rule for attorney withdrawal, 
which provides: “An attorney’s appearance may not be 
withdrawn except by leave of court, unless another attorney 
of this court shall at the same time enter an appearance for the 
same party.” E.D. Pa. Local R. Civ. P. 5.1(c).1 Although we 
affirmed the District Court’s order in Ohntrup II, we took 
issue with the notion that Morgan Lewis could not withdraw 
until MKEK hired substitute counsel. We said in that regard: 
We do not believe that such a result 
automatically follows in all cases from the 
language of [Local Rule 5.1(c)]. Otherwise, a 
lawyer in the present situation might be unable 
to withdraw at any time. Such a result is neither 
                                                 
1 Formerly E.D. Pa. Local R. Civ. P. 18(c). 
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mandated nor required for the effective 
administration of the judicial system. Rather, 
we conclude that a law firm is entitled to 
withdraw once the firm demonstrates to the 
satisfaction of the district court that its 
appearance serves no meaningful purpose, 
particularly insofar as an opposing interest is 
concerned. 
Id. at 679–80.  
A panel of our Court and district courts within the 
Third Circuit have interpreted the quoted passage in Ohntrup 
II as enunciating a “meaningful purpose” test that guides the 
district court’s discretion on a motion for leave to withdraw. 
These courts have formulated three- and four-factor tests to 
decipher the import of “meaningful purpose.”2 We perceive 
two problems with that approach. First, there is no multi-
factor test that a district court must apply to decide a motion 
for attorney withdrawal. Rules regarding attorney withdrawal 
are necessarily general because of the context-laden nature of 
such determinations. The interests to be considered will vary 
widely from case to case. Second, contrary to the District 
                                                 
2 See, e.g., Buschmeier v. G&G Investments, Inc., 222 
F. App’x 160 (3d Cir. 2007); Best Med. Int’l, Inc. v. Accuray, 
Inc., No. 2:10-CV-1043, 2014 WL 281676 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 24, 
2014); Sharp v. Verizon Del., Inc., No. 11-1209, 2012 WL 
6212615 (D. Del. Dec. 12, 2012); S.E.C. v. Asthma Disease 
Mgmt., Inc., No. 02-7436, 2012 WL 1658410 (E.D. Pa. May 
11, 2012); Select Brokerage Servs., Inc. v. Asset Building 
Consultants, Ltd., No. 10-953, 2011 WL 283186 (W.D. Pa. 
Jan. 26, 2011); Worldspan, L.P. v. Ultimate Living Grp., LLC, 
No. 03-1081, 2006 WL 1046942 (D. Del. Apr. 20, 2006). 
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Court’s interpretation, its discretion to grant a motion to 
withdraw does not begin with whether the attorney serves a 
meaningful purpose. Rather, we stated that when the law firm 
serves no meaningful purpose, it “is entitled to withdraw.” 
Ohntrup II, 802 F.2d at 680 (emphasis added). That is, it 
would be an abuse of discretion to deny its motion to 
withdraw. “The very concept of discretion presupposes a zone 
of choice within which the trial courts may go either way.” 
Kern v. TXO Prod. Corp., 738 F.2d 968, 971 (8th Cir. 1984). 
The point at which the law firm no longer serves a 
meaningful purpose in the case marks the outer boundary of 
the District Court’s discretion because withdrawal would be 
required at that point. By requiring “leave of court” before an 
attorney may withdraw, the local rules commit the decision 
on attorney withdrawal to the discretion of the district court. 
And that discretion is not governed by any “meaningful 
purpose” test.  
Here, the District Court granted the Firm’s renewed 
motion for withdrawal and did not abuse its discretion in 
doing so. Ohntrup claims the District Court erred because, 
without the Firm as counsel to MKEK, she will suffer 
onerous service requirements under the Hague Convention, 
which governs service on foreign defendants in countries, like 
Turkey, that have ratified the treaty.3 Ohntrup argues that 
                                                 
3 This question turns on the interpretation of Article 10 
of the Hague Convention, which governs service by mail. It is 
a question of first impression in our Court and one that 
divides the other courts of appeals. As an alternative to 
reversing the District Court’s dismissal of Morgan Lewis, 
Ohntrup asks us to hold that she may serve papers by mail 
without running afoul of the Hague Convention. This 
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such a burden weighs far more heavily than the Firm’s light 
burden of forwarding papers to Turkey. We disagree.  
At the time the District Court denied the Firm’s first 
motion to withdraw, it remained uncertain how the Ohntrups’ 
post-judgment proceedings would unfold and whether MKEK 
would comply with discovery requests served on the Firm. 
We affirmed the District Court’s initial denial of the motion 
to withdraw because there was a chance that the Firm’s 
presence would facilitate communication between the parties, 
not to guarantee Ohntrup the most convenient method to 
comply with the service requirements in the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure. By now, it is clear that the Firm is merely a 
captive, uncompensated process server and that Ohntrup’s 
efforts to communicate with MKEK through the Firm are 
futile. Accordingly, the District Court did not err when it 
granted the Firm’s motion to withdraw.4 
IV 
                                                                                                             
hypothetical question is not ripe for review. See Peachlum v. 
City of York, Pa., 333 F.3d 429, 433 (3d Cir. 2003). 
 
4 Ohntrup asserts that our decision in Ohntrup II, 
which affirmed the District Court’s statement denying the 
Firm’s motion to withdraw until MKEK obtains substitute 
counsel, is law of the case. The penultimate sentence in our 
opinion in Ohntrup II explicitly negates this argument: “Our 
affirmance is without prejudice to renewal of the motion at a 
later appropriate time even if no substitute counsel replaces 
Morgan.” 802 F.2d at 680. 
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We next consider Ohntrup’s appeal of the District 
Court’s order denying additional discovery in aid of 
execution. We review the denial of discovery for an abuse of 
discretion. Holmes v. Pension Plan of Bethlehem Steel Corp., 
213 F.3d 124, 138 (3d Cir. 2000).  
Our review of this order begins with a summary of the 
relevant factual and procedural history. Two months after 
Alliant announced its contract with MKEK, Ohntrup filed a 
motion for supplementary relief in aid of execution pursuant 
to Fed. R. Civ. P. 69(a) and Pa. R. Civ. P. 3118. Ohntrup 
asked the District Court to enjoin Alliant from transferring 
any property in its possession owned by MKEK and to 
compel Alliant to disclose information regarding its 
transactions with MKEK. At the recommendation of the 
Magistrate Judge, the District Court denied Ohntrup’s request 
for an injunction, but granted discovery, subject to a 
confidentiality order to protect Alliant’s confidential business 
information.  
Following the District Court’s order, Alliant produced 
its current agreements with MKEK, along with information 
on MKEK’s finances and Alliant’s shipments to Turkey. 
Ohntrup’s lawyers alleged deficiencies in Alliant’s responses, 
but the Magistrate Judge disagreed, holding that Alliant was 
not required to supplement its responses with specifics on 
future shipments. Soon thereafter, Ohntrup served Alliant 
with three additional sets of discovery requests, mostly 
concerning the timing of the shipments. Alliant moved to 
quash those requests, and the Magistrate Judge issued an 
order reaffirming her decision that Alliant need not 
supplement its responses. Upon review of the Magistrate 
Judge’s order, the District Court held that additional 
discovery would be an “undue burden” on Alliant under Pa. 
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R. Civ. P. 4011(b) because: (1) discovery may jeopardize 
Alliant’s relationship with MKEK, (2) Alliant is an innocent 
third party, (3) it would incur expenses responding to 
discovery, and (4) discovery may be futile if the Foreign 
Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), 28 U.S.C. § 1330 et seq., 
protects the components from attachment.  
The District Court’s analysis improperly considered 
the possibility that discovery might be futile without 
determining whether that was in fact the case. Although the 
District Court is correct that “there is doubt as to whether 
Plaintiffs will likely be able to execute on their judgments,” 
Ohntrup’s potential inability to show that the subject property 
is not immune from attachment is immaterial to the question 
of unreasonable burden.5 See App. at 14. Ohntrup should not 
be penalized in the pursuit of discovery in aid of execution 
merely because a novel or difficult question of law is 
implicated. Accordingly, we will remand so the District Court 
may analyze the question anew.  
This does not mean that Alliant must wait until 
Ohntrup files a writ of execution if it wishes to argue that the 
FSIA bars attachment. Consistent with the Supreme Court’s 
recent pronouncement regarding the FSIA, if MKEK’s 
munitions manufacturing components are immune from 
attachment, then the District Court should deny Ohntrup’s 
discovery request “because information that could not 
                                                 
5 The District Court relied on the “unreasonable . . . 
burden” rule in Pa. R. Civ. P. 4011(b) for its ruling, but used 
the “undue burden” term of Fed. R. Civ. P. 45. As the District 
Court applied the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure, we 
will use the language of those rules. 
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possibly lead to executable assets is simply not ‘relevant’ to 
execution in the first place.” Republic of Argentina v. NML 
Capital, Ltd., 134 S. Ct. 2250, 2257 (2014) (quoting Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 26(b)(1)). Thus, if Alliant can persuade the District 
Court that Ohntrup cannot attach the targeted property, then 
Ohntrup’s discovery would be irrelevant under Rule 4011(c).6 
Conversely, if the District Court concludes that the targeted 
property is not immune, that fact would obviously weigh in 
Ohntrup’s favor. Finally, if the District Court chooses not to 
decide whether the targeted property is subject to attachment 
or lacks sufficient information to reach a definitive 
conclusion on the issue before discovery, any speculation in 
that regard should not be a factor in the Court’s unreasonable 
burden analysis. See NML Capital, 134 S. Ct. at 2257-58. 
* * * 
For the reasons stated, we will affirm the District 
Court’s order granting Morgan Lewis’s motion to withdraw 
as counsel for MKEK. We will vacate the order of the District 
Court precluding discovery and remand the case for 
additional proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
                                                 
6 As the party objecting to the discovery, Alliant would 
bear the burden of persuasion on the FSIA issue. See Winck v. 
Daley Mack Sales Inc., 21 Pa. D. & C.3d 399, 404 (Pa. Com. 
Pl. 1980). We do not decide who bears the burden of 
persuasion when a party actually attempts to attach property 
that is arguably immune and the FSIA is directly at issue. 
  
